»Der Bundeswehreinsatz in Afghanistan hat die bestehende Machtverteilung zementiert«

Since the beginning of the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, the contributing nations to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have declared that their aim is to ‘assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority’ over the whole territory of Afghanistan. This report attempts to answer whether and to what extent ISAF forces have been successful in accomplishing their task in the two northeastern provinces of Kunduz and Badakhshan. To answer the question, this report maps the power distribution and the constellations between the most significant political actors of both provinces and relates them to actions of the central government and the international actors working in Afghanistan. In unprecedented detail, this study takes the first step toward assessing ISAF’s effects and uncovers developments on the grassroots level that have been largely unnoticed. It hopes to encourage further research on other regions and thereby kickstart a more comprehensive lessons learned process that goes beyond mere technicalities and acknowledges the social realities of power and rule in Afghanistan. […]

Since 2004, Germany has led both provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Kunduz and Badakhshan and therefore provided most forces in these areas. In contrast to representatives of other nations, the Germans attempted only in a few instances to actively influence the major power structure. Once they tried to replace provincial chiefs of police in the context of police pay and rank reform (PRR). However, they did not intentionally target the power structures as such, but aimed at illegal and unprofessional behaviour of police officials in general. Generally, they kept to the legalistic principle of cooperating with official power holders and otherwise tried to stay neutral. But in some cases, they also worked with the strongest unofficial actors to prevent conflicts and trouble for the PRTs. In 2009, the Americans significantly reinforced their troops in Kunduz because the insurgency in the northeast had grown tremendously. They focussed on fighting the Taleban and their allies. To this end, they supported militias who belonged to local power brokers. A lack of strategy, related to the different interests involved, hampered all of ISAF’s efforts, including those to actively influence the local power structure. […]

The approach of the mainly German PRT forces – to focus on the official as well as, in some cases, the most powerful strongmen – cemented the existing power distribution. In addition, though the underprivileged segments of the population in both provinces initially greeted German efforts to prevent ‘collateral damage’, because they cooperated with government officials, locals saw them as accomplices of the ruling class. The Americans ’ counterinsurgency approach had the same effects since to fight the insurgents they allied with established power brokers and finally helped them to fight back attempts to challenge the latter’s rule. Any changes of the local power structure the internationals attempted only worked in cooperation with local allies. The results of this study show that the post 2001 international intervention did not significantly change the power structure of Kunduz and Badakhshan province. Rather, it affected how the actors dealt with each other and strengthened some pre 2002 trends. Mostly, however, the local power brokers, who were mostly (former) commanders, determined the result of the power struggles.

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