»Die Anzahl einsatzfähiger Sprengköpfe steigt«

At the start of 2024, nine states—the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) and Israel—together possessed approximately 12121 nuclear weapons, of which 9585 were considered to be potentially operationally available. An estimated 3904 of these warheads were deployed with operational forces, including about 2100 that were kept in a state of high operational alert—about 100 more than the previous year.

Overall, the number of nuclear warheads in the world continues to decline. However, this is only due to the USA and Russia dismantling retired warheads. Global reductions of operational warheads appear to have stalled, and their numbers are rising again. The USA and Russia, which together possess almost 90 per cent of all nuclear weapons, have extensive programmes under way to replace and modernize their nuclear warheads, their missile, aircraft and submarine delivery systems, and their nuclear weapon production facilities.

China is in the middle of a significant modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal. Its nuclear stockpile is expected to continue growing over the coming decade and some projections suggest that China could potentially deploy at least as many intercontinental ballistic missiles as either Russia or the USA in that period. Even so, China’s overall nuclear warhead stock pile is expected to remain smaller than that of either of those states.

The nuclear arsenals of the other nucleararmed states are even smaller, but all are either developing or deploying new weapon systems or have announced their intention to do so. India and Pakistan also appear to be increasing the size of their nuclear weapon inventories, and the UK plans to increase its stockpile. North Korea’s military nuclear programme remains central to its national security strategy and it may have assembled up to 50 nuclear weapons and could produce more. Israel continues to maintain its longstanding policy of nuclear ambiguity, leaving significant uncertainty about the number and characteristics of its nuclear weapons.

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