»Innerhalb von Monaten wurden im Irak 12 000 Zivilisten getötet«

Introduction

Iraq has historically been home to a rich tapestry of ethnic and religious communities whose history of coexistence in the region dates back thousands of years. In addition to the three main components of Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs and Sunni Kurds, Iraq’s demographic composition includes ethnic and religious minorities, such as Chaldo- Assyrian and Armenian Christians, Turkmen, Yezidis, Kaka’i, Shabak, Sabean-Mandaeans, Baha’i, and Faili Kurds, as well as Roma and Black Iraqis.

However, the recent history of minorities in Iraq has been one of repression, conflict, displacement and persecution. The Sunni Arab-dominated government of Saddam Hussein maintained its authoritarian power on the basis of discriminatory, divisive, and ultimately genocidal policies towards Kurds, Shia Muslims, and ethnic and religious minorities. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 prompted the collapse of the state and the eruption of brutal sectarian violence. During the worst violence in 2006-2007, tens of thousands of Iraqis were killed and many more fled the country. Minorities were often the victims of this violence. An estimated 30 per cent of refugees leaving the country were ethnic or religious minorities, according to the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Despite the adoption of a new constitution in 2005, the holding of elections, and the agreement of autonomy for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the position of minorities remained precarious. The administrative status of the regions in which many minorities lived remained in limbo, and minorities paid the price for power struggles between the federal government of Iraq and the KRG. The Shia-dominated government led by Nouri Al-Maliki alienated many Sunnis, leading to large-scale protests and violent resistance. This discontent has propelled the rise of militant Sunni groups, especially the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which later shortened its name to the Islamic State. Fuelled by gains made in neighbouring Syria, ISIS and allied groups have engaged in systematic campaigns of violence against Shia Muslims and religious minorities.

In June 2014, ISIS fighters took control of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, and historically home to many minorities, causing an estimated 500,000 people to flee in the first week alone. ISIS then proceeded to take control of Tikrit and in early August swept across the Ninewa governorate, taking control of many villages historically home to minority communities. Iraq is now in the midst of the highest levels of violence since the sectarian strife of 2006-2007. As of the end of September, the death toll for 2014 had already reached over 12,000 civilians, a sharp increase from 2013.1 Minorities have been one of the primary targets of this violence. In ISIS-controlled areas, militants have engaged in summary executions, forced conversions, kidnappings, torture, rapes, sexual trafficking, looting and destruction of properties. By mid-July an estimated 1.2 million people2 had been displaced as a result of the violence, a large proportion of them minorities. Hundreds of thousands have sought refuge in the KRG with little more than the clothes on their backs and are living a precarious existence as humanitarian agencies struggle to cope with the influx.

The situation of minorities in Iraq has now reached the point of desperation. Many minority communities have been reduced in size by emigration and killing to the point that they are now in danger of extinction in Iraq. Villages in Ninewa governorate that have been home to minority communities for thousands of years have been all but emptied of their inhabitants. Across Iraq, the minorities who do remain live in constant fear for their safety. Their religious sites are the target of attacks and they are afraid of openly displaying their religious identities. Their areas suffer from deliberate neglect and they face high barriers in accessing education, employment, housing, healthcare and other essential services. Those who try to start a new life in the relatively safer Kurdistan region face a whole new set of obstacles, from linguistic barriers, discrimination, political marginalization and difficulty in finding employment and accessing public services.

This report seeks to give a comprehensive picture of the current situation of minorities in Iraq in order to inform the development of policies and strategies to improve their situation. It covers major human rights violations which took place in 2013-2014 as well as more long-term manifestations of discrimination present in the social, economic, political, legal and cultural fields. Action to improve the situation of minorities will require concerted effort and cooperation on the part of the federal government of Iraq, the KRG, and relevant international bodies.

The advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)* is the latest incarnation in a long line of extremist Islamist insurgency movements whose origins date back to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Although the movement emerged as an offshoot of Al-Qaida in Iraq, it acts independently of the network, and increasingly in competition with it. Under the leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the group has managed to revive Iraq’s Sunni Islamist insurgency movement since its major setback during the US-led ‘surge’ and coordinated Sahawat (Sunni Arab ‘Awakening’) campaigns of 2007-8. Arguably, the increasingly sectarian and repressive policies of Nouri al- Maliki’s government, the uprising in neighbouring Syria and the government’s violent reaction towards Sunni Arab protest movements in 2012-3 have been the major facilitators for the resurgence of the Islamist network across the Sunni Arab dominated provinces of Anbar, Salah al-Din, Diyala and large parts of Ninawa. ISIS began orchestrating major offensives, openly confronting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Kurdish Peshmerga and Shia militias. These campaigns were a noticeable evolution from al-Qaida’s terror tactics (based on improvised explosive devices and vehicle and suicide bombings) and an early sign of its new-found capabilities to mobilise resources that were able to confront and defeat Iraq’s military on the battlefield. The first phase of the ISIS advance saw the capture of al-Qaida’s traditional strongholds of Fallujah and Ramadi on 3 and 4 January 2014. In February 2014, Al-Qaida’s Leader – Ayman Al- Zawahiri – formally disassociated ISIS from his network following months of feuding, including over strategy in Syria.

By mid-June, ISIS advanced rapidly in Iraq, capturing swathes of territory and major population centres. On 9 June, Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, fell, followed by the fall of Tikrit on 11 June and the strategic towns of Tal Afar and Al Qaim near the Syrian border on 16 and 21 June respectively. Although ISIS had had a string of victories, the capture of Mosul came as a surprise to many observers, as the city boasted an ISF garrison of 30,000 – most had been routed, leaving a large inventory of heavy weapons and ammunition to ISIS insurgents. Although many of Iraq’s Sunni Arab tribes oppose Al-Qaida’s extreme interpretation of Islam and its violent methods, they did not appear to be willing to confront ISIS on behalf of what they perceived to be a majoritarian and oppressive central government. Furthermore, the successive capture and consolidation of the Sunni Arab heartland cities and towns indicate a collaboration between ISIS and some local tribes as well as former Ba’athist insurgents such as Jaish Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandia (JRTN), who retain both military know-how and local support. Conversely throughout June, the strategically important city of Baquba and Shia pilgrimage city of Samarra were able successfully to repel multiple attacks, with Iranian support, again suggesting a sectarian-centred dynamic to the nature of security within Iraq.

On 16 June, shortly after the capture of Mosul, ISIS posted images showing the mass executions of captured Iraq soldiers. The then rebranded ‘Islamic State’ group began launching offensives against minority-dominated towns across northern Iraq. Zumar and Sinjar quickly fell on 2 and 3 August. Kurdish forces were forced to withdraw from these vulnerable areas, leaving a devastating humanitarian crisis. The rapid speed of the ISIS advance and the horrific nature of the atrocities committed (including most recently against US citizens), has prompted the mobilisation of international military support in aid of Iraqi and Kurdish forces.

* Widely known in Iraq by its Arabic acronym Da-ash. Also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Formerly, the Islamic State of Iraq. The group changed its name in June 2014 to the Islamic State (IS). 

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