»Die Griechenlandkredite gingen überwiegend an die Gläubiger«

There were reasonable and unreasonable arguments to not conduct a haircut in Greek government debt in April 2010. The lack of an immediate significant restructuring of Greek government debt was (correctly) anticipated by investors in the years before 2010 and was mirrored in the relatively low risk premia charged by these investors. The reasonable arguments comprise in particular the fear of contagion just 19 months after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the looming risk of another financial crisis. The unreasonable arguments deal with the fear of major losses in particular in German and French banks as major investors in Greek government debt, and the resulting necessity of a recapitalization in these banks. It is reasonable to assume that the public debate would have taken a different direction if losses had been borne by Germany and France right away, making it more difficult in public sentiment to seek the responsibility in Greece alone. In sum, the lack of a haircut and the subsequent bailout packages led to the transfer of risk from private to public creditors. In general, early creditor losses are important to achieve a significant reduction of government debt, before any fresh funds should be put at risk.

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